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BUTLER v. AMERICAN TRAWLER COMPANY 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 6 October 1989 
887 F.2d20 
An invited ship passenger's diversity action against a wharf owner to recover for injuries sustained while attemping to 
board a docked ship was governed by maritime law's three year statute of limitations. 
FACTS: Barbara Butler alleged that on May 8, 1984, she tried 
to board a ship, the Sea Lion VII, docked in Newington, New 
Hampshire. As she approached the end of the wharf, she noticed 
that the ladder from the wharf to the ship was not usable. She 
decided to climb down to the Sea Lion VII using the vessel's 
rigging, which was in close proximity to the wharf. While at­
tempting to board the ship in this manner, she severely injured 
her finger in the ship's rigging. She sued on the theory of 
negligence, claiming that American Trawler, the owner of the 
wharf, failed to provide a usable ladder. The district court 
granted American Trawler's motion for summary judgment. 
The motion was based upon Butler's failure to file suit within 
the three year statute of limitations, imposed by federal 
maritime law. 46 U.S.C. App. §763a. Butler had argued that 
Maine's six year statute of limitations applied. 
ISSUE: Whether boarding a ship bears significant relation to 
traditional maritime activities, for the purposes of determing in 
a diversity suit, whether a tort that occurs while boarding a 
ship, is within admiralty jurisdiction and thereby governed by 
maritime law? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Fifth Circuit, held 
that boarding a ship was within admiralty jurisdiction and 
governed by maritime law's three year statute of limitations. 
Maritime law will govern if admiralty jurisdiction pertains. 
Austin v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). 
Admiralty jurisdiction will lie when the tort at issue 1) occured 
on navigable waters and 2) bore a significant relation to tradi­
tional maritime activities. In the case at hand, the tort occurred 
on navigable waters. The fact that the injury took place on the 
ship, precluded a debate over whether the wharf was to be 
considered part of the land. For the purposes of admiralty juris­
diction, the controlling case law holds that the tort occurs where 
the negligence "takes effect," not where the negligent act took 
place. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 
266 (1972). 
In addition to the fact that the injury occurred on navigable 
waters, is the unarguable fact that the boarding of a ship bears a 
significant relationship to the traditional activities associated 
with maritime tasks. Boarding and walking on a ship is signific­
antly different from walking into and around a building. 
Butler alleges that the three year federal statute of limitations 
is not applicable because it is not part of substantive maritime 
law. Butler claims that the three year statute of limitations is 
procedural, therefore, the federal court should apply the six 
year Maine statute of limitations for this diversity action. The 
Supreme Court has made clear that a maritime tort is a "type of 
action wh�ch the constitution has placed under national power 
to control in its substantive as well as its procedural features." 
This negates the need to discuss what part of the legal lore will 
surround the terms "procedural" and "substantive". Pope & 
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 ( 1953). Thus the relevant 
question is not whether the federal statute of limitations, 46 
U.S.C. App. §763(a), is "substantive" or "procedural," but 
whether Congress intended the statute to preclude the operation 
of different state limitations in respect to maritime torts. The 
language and the legislative history of the subsequently enacted 
federal statutes contain nothing to suggest that Congress in­
tended to permit states to apply their own, differing statutes of 
limitations. In 46 U.S.C. App. §763(a), the words "unless 
otherwise specified by law," refer only to federal law, and not to 
state law. 
Under general maritime law, therefore, a plaintiff may not 
begin a personal injury action, based upon a maritime tort, more 
than "three years from the date the cause of action accrued." 
Butler's action was correctly dismissed for failing to file the suit 
within the applicable time period. 
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